How can Barack Obama succeed where Sean Connery and Michael Caine failed? Before his impending performance of “The Man Who Would Be President”, Mr. Obama should first consider the successful invasions of Afghanistan.
Yes, contrary to the media’s incessant references to “the graveyard of empires”, Afghanistan has been conquered a number of times. The Russians certainly failed, but Afghanistan has succumbed to the Persians, the Greeks, the Mongols, even the British. And do think the country became Moslem just through Arab charm?
History tells us that there are two different approaches to conquering Afghanistan. The first may be summarized as “force and finesse.” This strategy concedes that Afghanistan is practically ungovernable, and the best you can do to tilt the anarchy in your favor. Conquer Kabul–anyone can do that–and then start negotiating with the various tribes that actually rule the region. In return for acknowledging your titular control, you will ally yourself with one tribe against another. (Trying to pick the most grateful or least treacherous tribe can be the challenge.)
This was the Persian approach and, after three years of fighting mountain to mountain, Alexander adopted it too. He even married the daughter of a tribal chieftain, that rare instance when politics makes straight bedfellows. Alexander, however, thought that Bactria (as Afghanistan was then known) could use another tribe: a colony of Greeks. He even built towns for these outposts of Hellenization: the city of Kandahar originally was named Alexandria. The Greek hold of Bactria lasted some two centuries, and their culture pervaded beyond those borders. In Northern India, the statues of Buddha looked remarkably like Apollo.
The British Empire had no real interest in Afghanistan (as it has been known since the 18th century) but it was an unruly neighbor of India–which the British did dearly covet. So the British thought that a show of force might induce some traquility among the warring Afghan tribes. In 1839, a British army of 21,000 occupied the major cities of Afghanistan and anointed a pet prince to be the region’s Emir. There was so little resistance that nearly two thirds of the army returned to India. However, the British optimism proved premature. Of the 3600 men stationed in Kabul, one survived the ensuing massacre in 1842. A British army invaded Afghanistan but only to safely rescue and evacuate the besieged British garrisons in other Afghan cities. Afghanistan returned to a sovereign state of chaos; you can guess the fate of the British designated Emir.
Britain was resigned to Afghan anarchy and brigandage, but not an Emir who allied himself to the Russians. In 1878, the prospect of Russian encrouchment on India led Britain into another Afghan war. A British army of 40,000 invaded the country; the Emir conceded to London’s demands. And, as the British forces were withdrawing, the British embassy staff at Kabul was massacred. (Well, it is an Afghan tradition.) Back came the British army and out went the Emir; he would spend the next 43 years in India as a “guest” of the British. The British replaced him first with his brother and then with an even more compliant cousin. He and his successors reached an understanding with the British; they could expect a generous allowance in Pounds Sterling, they were free to determine Afghanistan’s domestic policies–if any–but they need not bother with a foreign policy. London would make those decisions. This little arrangement lasted until 1919.
So President Obama has these precedents in “force and finesse.” The real challenge in this strategy is picking the right stooge.
The second approach to Afghanistan can be expressed as “annihilation or else.” This was how the Arabs marketed Islam. In the seventh century, religious fanaticism and cavalry made Islam nearly irresistible. Even the desolation of Afghanistan was little hindrance to an army accustomed to the deserts of Arabia. The conquered pagans were presented with a compelling argument for Islam: conversion or death. Since the indigenous theological mix of Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and animism had not proved much of a protection, the Afghans conceded the superiority of Allah.
Genghis Khan also applied this approach, although he did not offer any theological solace. For a 13th century barbarian, he was a pioneer in mass communication. Genghis offered free samples of massacres and then let word-of-mouth do the rest. The towns that did not comply with immediate and abject surrender would learn the Mongol hobby of collecting decapitated heads and building them into pyramids. Such recreation perpetuated Mongol rule in Afghanistan for more than four centuries. Over time, the Mongols did convert to Islam; jihads and harems had such a spiritual appeal. Known by the more Arabic pronunciation of Mogul, they overran India and made Islam so very popular there.
“Annihilation or else” was most recently used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. They had the prerequisite ruthlessness for the strategy but not the necessary budget. War is more expensive than it used to be, and the Soviet Union was a fourth-rate economy trying to prop us a world empire. Mohammed and the Koran might inspire threadbare soldiers to conquer. Leonid Brezhnev and “Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism” did not incite the same level of heroics. The Soviet soldiers probably were willing to trade their tanks for food.
So, “annihilation or else” can be effective when practiced by religious fanatics or sociopaths–but they lost the last election here. Furthermore, the American public certainly would rather commit war crimes against Venezuela, Iran or France.
No, President Obama will choose some variation of “force and finesse.” Bribes and half-measures are the American way.